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Abstract 
Recently, Cao et al. proposed an identity-based pairing-free two-party authenticated key agreement (ID-2PAKA) protocol using 
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). We have shown that Cao’s protocol is vulnerable to two attacks called known session-specific 
temporary information attack (KSTIA) and key off-set attack (KOA). In this paper, we proposed an improved paring-free ID-
2PAKA protocol based on ECC that not only eliminates the weaknesses of Cao et al.’s protocol, but also provides resilience 
against other known attacks, the detail security of which are provided. Our protocol requires minimal message exchanges and 
minimum computational overheads. Finally, the proposed protocol has been compared with other relevant protocols and expected 
outcome has been found. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of ICCTSD 2011. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, several ID-2PAKA protocol using ECC and bilinear parings have been proposed. Smart [1] 
proposed an ID-2PAKA protocol using Boneh and Franklin’s IBE scheme [2], but Shim [3], Chen-Kudla [4] proved 
that Smart’s protocol does not provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS). Shim proposed an efficient ID-2PAKA 
protocol using Weil pairing [2] and claimed that it is secured against all known attacks, but Sun and Hsieh [5] 
proved that Shim’s protocol fails to resist the man-in-the-middle attack (MIMA). Ryu et al. [6] also proposed an ID-
2PAKA protocol using parings; however, Boyd and Choo [7] showed that Ryu’s protocol is vulnerable to key-
compromised impersonation (K-CI) attack.  In 2009, Wang et al. [8] independently shows that Ryu’s protocol is not 
secure against reflection attack (RA) and made an improvement to resist several attacks. McCullagh and Barreto [9] 
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proposed an ID-2PAKA protocol, which was found out by Xie [10] that the protocol is not secure against K-CI 
attack. Then Xie proposed an ID-2PAKA protocol, but Li et al. [11] shows that it still vulnerable to K-CI attack. 
Most of the ID-2PAKA protocol employs bilinear parings and map-to-point (MTP) function for implementation. 
Since these are time-consuming operations, thus the implementation of ID-2PAKA using pairing-free is approached. 
Recently, Zhu [12] and Cao et al. [13] independently proposed paring free ID-2PAKA protocols that require three 
message exchanges. In 2010, Cao et al. [14] also proposed a paring free ID-2PAKA protocol with two messages, 
thus it reduces the number of messages and minimizes computation costs. 
In this paper, we have shown that Cao’s protocol is vulnerable to KSTIA and KOA attacks, and proposed some 
modification of Cao’s protocol and proved that the proposed protocol is more secure and computationally efficient. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the necessary technical backgrounds of the 
proposed work. In Section 3, Cao et al.’s protocol is revisited and weaknesses of it are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 illustrates the proposed ID-2PAKA protocol and the security and performance analysis of the proposed 
protocol are given in Section 6. The concluding remarks are provided in Section 7. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section, we first introduce the basics concept of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and Identity-based 
cryptosystem (IBC), and some of the computationally hard problems on the elliptic curve group are given. 
2.1.   Elliptic curve cryptography 
Let Ep(a,b) be a set of elliptic curve points over the prime field Fp, defined by the non-singular elliptic curve 
equation: 
                    y2 mod p = (x3+ax+b) mod p  with a, bFp and (4a3+27b2) mod p ≠ 0.                                            (1) 
The additive elliptic curve group defined as Gp = {(x, y): x,y Fp and (x, y) Ep(a, b)}∪{O}, where the point O 
is known as “point at infinity”. The scalar multiplication on the cyclic group Gp defined as k∙P =P+P+∙∙∙+P (k 
times). The elliptic curve cryptosystem was initially proposed by Koblitz (1987) and Miller (1985) to design public 
key cryptosystem and presently it is widely used in several cryptographic schemes [17-19] to provide desired level 
of security and computational efficiency. Details of elliptic curve group properties are given in [20].  
2.2.   Identity-based cryptosystem 
The IBC is a public-key cryptosystem proposed by Shamir [21] in 1984. The basic concept of IBC is that the user 
can choose arbitrary string, for example, the email address, any online identifiers, etc., as their public key and the 
corresponding private key is generated by binding the identity of the user with a master-key of a trusted authority, 
called private key generator (PKG). In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [3] gave the full functional solution for IBC, called 
IBE using bilinear pairing over the elliptic curve. 
2.3.   Computational problems 
Definition 1. (Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)). Given (P, Q)Gp, find an integer k[1, n-1] 
such that Q=k·P. 
Definition 2. (Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP)). Given (P, aP, bP)  Gp for any a, b[1, n-1], 
computation of a·b·P is hard to the group Gp. 
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3. Review of Cao’s pairing-free ID-2PAKA protocol 
In this section, we reviewed the Cao’s ID-2PAKA protocol, which consists of three randomized algorithms─ 
Setup, Extract, and Key agreement. 
3.1.   Setup 
It takes a security parameter 1k, returns the system parameters and a master-key. Given k, KGC does the 
followings: 
Step 1. Choose a k-bit prime p and determine the tuple {Fp, E/Fp, Gp, P}. 
Step 2. Choose the master-key xZp* and compute the system public key Ppub = x·P. 
Step 3. Choose two hash functions H1:{0,1}*×GpZp* and H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*×Gp×Gp×Gp ×Gp{0,1}k. 
Step 4. Publish {Fp, E/Fp, Gp, P, Ppub, H1, H2} as system parameters and keep the master-key x secret. 
3.2.   Extract 
It takes system parameters, master-key, and a user’s identity as inputs and returns the user’s private key. With 
this algorithm, the KGC works as follows for each user U with identifier IDU: 
Step 1. Choose a random number rZp*, compute RU = r·P and h = H1(IDU||RU). 
Step 2. Compute sU = r + h·x. 
U’s private key is key is the pair (sU,RU) and is transmitted to U via a secure channel. The private key is valid if 
the equation sU·P = RU + H1(IDU||RU)·Ppub holds and vice versa. 
3.3.   Key agreement 
For two users A and B to establish an authenticated session key with two messages, they should do as follows: 
Step 1. To start an AKA session with the intended responder B, the initiator A will: 
1) Choose a random number aRZp* and compute TA = a·P. 
2) Send (IDA, RA, TA) to B. 
Step 2. On receiving the initiation message (IDA, RA, TA) from A, B will: 
1) Choose a random number bRZp* and compute TB = b·P. 
2) Send (IDB, RB, TB) to A. 
 
Then both A and B can compute the shared secrets as follows: User A computes 
KAB1=sATB+a(RB+H1(IDB||RB)Ppub)=sAbP+aPB=bPA+aPB and KAB2=aTB=abP, and the session key as 
sk=H2(IDA||IDB||TA||TB||KAB1||KAB2). Now, B computes KBA1=sBTA+b(RA+H1(IDA||RA)Ppub)=sBaP+bPA=bPA+aPB and 
KBA2=bTA=abP, and the session key as sk=H2(IDA||IDB||TA||TB||KBA1||KBA2). Thus, both of the users A and B hold the 
same session key sk. 
4. Weaknesses of Cao’s ID-2PAKA protocol 
In this section, we show that Cao’s ID-2PAKA protocol is vulnerable to the KSTIA attack and key KOA attack. 
4.1.   Key off-set attack 
The key offset attack was described by Blake-Wilson et al. [22] that an active adversary can off-set the agreed 
session key by an exponent σ, which is unknown to both A and B.  
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All the key agreement protocols [1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 14] without key confirmation are vulnerable to this 
attack. From the attack the adversary does not gain any knowledge about the agreed session key, but two entities 
generate wrong session key. This is a violation of the key integrity property which indicates that any accepted 
session key should depend only on inputs from the protocol principles. Now we describe how this attack works in 
Cao’s protocol is given in Fig. 1. 
4.2.   Known session-specific temporary information attack  
It was demonstrated by Cheng et al. [22] that if the session short-term secrets are leaked to an adversary 
accidentally, but the generated session key should not be affected. In Cao’s protocol, user A and B computes the 
session key sk=H2(IDA||IDB||TA||TB||KAB1||KAB2), the entire security of the session key is depends on the secrecy of 
KAB1=bPA+aPB and KAB2=abP i.e., depends on a and b. Now if these two values a and b are exposed to an adversary 
accidentally, then he can computes KAB1=b(RA+H1(IDA||RA)Ppub)+a(RB+H1(IDB||RB)Ppub)=bPA+aPB= KBA1 and 
KAB2=abP= KBA2, and then computes the resulting session key sk=H2(IDA||IDB||TA||TB||KAB1||KAB2), because 
(IDA,IDB,TA,TB,RA,RB,Ppub) all are the public information. Thus, the Cao’s ID-2PAKA fails to meet this security 
property. However, the protocols [9, 12-14] are also vulnerable to this attack, as the session key of their protocol 
depends on the session ephemeral secrets a and b only. The detailed description of this attack is given in Fig. 2. 
Fig. 1. Key off-set attack in Cao’s protocol. 




Fig. 2. KSTIA attack in Cao’s protocol. 
5. Proposed ID-2P AKA protocol 
In this section, we proposed an improved pairing-free ID-2PAKA protocol, which eliminates the security flaws 
of Cao’s protocol. The proposed protocol has three phases- Setup, Extract, and Key agreement. Although, Setup 
phase and Extract phase are same as of Cao’s protocol, but the proposed key agreement phase differs from Cao’s 
key agreement phase as described below. 
Step 1. The user A performs the following operations: 
1) Select a random number aRZp* and compute TA = a·PA. 
2) Send (IDA,TA,RA) to the user B. 
Step 2. After receiving the message (IDA,TA,RA), then B executes the following operations: 
1) Select a random number bRZp* and compute TB = b·PB. 
2) Compute KBA=dB·[TA+b·(RA+H1(IDA||RA)·Ppub)]=a·dA·dB·P+b·dA·dB·P=(a+b)·dA·dB·P and the session 
key sk=H2(IDA||IDB||TA||TB||KBA). Now the user B sends (IDB,TB,RB,MACsk) to A, where 
MACsk=H1(TA||TB||sk). 
 
After the successful completion of message exchanges, A computes KAB=dA·[TB+a·(RB+H1(IDB||RB)·Ppub)] 
=b·dA·dB·P+a·dA·dB·P=(a+b)·dA·dB·P, the session key sk=H2(IDA||IDB||TA||TB||KAB) and the authentication token 
MACsk*=H1(TA||TB||sk). Then, A checks the condition MACsk*=?MACsk . If it holds, A accept the session key sk, 
otherwise sends an authentication-failed message to B. The proposed protocol is further explained in Fig. 3. 























Fig. 3. Proposed ID-2PAKA Protocol. 
 
6. Security analysis 
The proposed protocol satisfies all the security properties as defined by Blake-Wilson et al. [22] and we are now 
going to discuss them. 
6.1.   Known session-specific temporary information attack (KSTIA) 
Following the proposed protocol, user A and B computes the session key as sk=H2(IDA||IDB||TA||TB||KAB), 
security of which is depends on the secrecy of KAB= (a+b)·dA·dB·P. However, if the session ephemeral secrets a and 
b are exposed to an adversary, but he cannot computes the session key sk. He can generate the session key if he 
knows dA·dB·P. However, knowing the pair (PA, PB)=(dA·P,dB·P) from which computation of  dA·dB·P is impossible 
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due to difficulties of solving the CDHP problem. Therefore, the known-session specific temporary information 
attack is not possible. 
6.2.   Key off-set attack (KOA) 
In our protocol, user A sends the message (IDA, TA, RA) to B. Suppose that the adversary E modifies it to 
(IDA,TA*,RA), where TA*=σ∙TA. Now B computes the session key sk*=H2(IDA||IDB||TA*||TB||KBA*), where KBA* = 
σ∙a∙dA·dB·P+b·dA·dB·P=(σ∙a+b)·dA·dB·P and returns the message (IDB, TB, RB, MACsk*) to A. Again, the adversary E 
modifies TB to TB*= σ∙TB, but does not change the MACsk*, because he has no ability to compute it without B’s 
secret. Now the user A computes KAB*= σ∙b∙dA·dB·P+a·dA·dB·P =(a+σ∙b)·dA·dB·P and the session key 
sk**=H2(IDA||IDB||TA||TB*||KAB*), and the authentication token MACsk**=H1(TA||TB*||sk**) and then compares it 
with received MACsk*. However, MACsk** ≠ MACsk*, and therefore, user A rejects the session key agreement and 
sends an authentication-failed message to B. Thus, the key off-set attack is not possible. 
6.3.   Known-key attack (K-KA) 
If any session key is compromised it does not mean that other session keys are also compromised. In the 
proposed protocol, the agreed session key sk depends on two random ephemeral secrets a, b and these are different 
in each session. The adversary may not derive a and b from TA and TB due to the difficulties of ECDLP problem. So 
the disclosure of one session key does not allow the adversary to gain the knowledge about other session keys. 
6.4.   Perfect forward security (PFS) and PKG forward security (PKG-FS) 
If the secret keys of A and B are compromised, it does not allow an adversary to recover any past session keys. 
The adversary E may compute the session key sk if he knows KAB=(a+b)·dA·dB·P. Suppose dA and dB are disclosed to 
E, he may compute dA·dB·P, but not (a+b)·dA·dB·P as a and b are unknown to E. He can try to derive a and b from TA 
and TB, but it is not possible as ECDLP is not solvable by in a polynomial time algorithm. In other way, E tries to 
derive a∙dA·dB·P from (TA, PB) = (a∙dA·P, dB·P) and b∙dA·dB·P from (TB, PA) = (a∙dB·P, dA·P) directly and then 
(a+b)·dA·dB·P from them. However, these are also not possible due to hardness of CDHP problem. From this 
discussion one can see that, if the secret key of PKG is disclosed, the secret key of all participants are compromised, 
but the current or past session keys are still secured. Thus, the perfect forward security and PKG forward security 
are preserved in our protocol. 
6.5.   Key-compromise impersonation attack (K-CI) 
Assume that A’s secret key dA is exposed to an adversary, and then he tries to impersonate B to A for obtaining 
the resulting session key. The adversary intercepts the A’s message (IDA, TA, RA) and then computes TB=b·PB (b is 
selected by the adversary) but he cannot computes KBA=(a+b)·dA·dB·P, because with known TA, random number b 
and the public key PB, he can computes (a+b)·dA·P, but not (a+b)·dA·dB·P. To derive (a+b)·dA·dB·P, he has to know 
B’s secret key dB, but there is no way to learn it. So the session key generation is not possible by the adversary and 
thus the risk of being impersonation by key-compromise impersonation attack is impossible. 
6.6.   No key control (NKC) 
In our scheme, both participants A and B have an input into the session key neither participant can force the full 
session key to be a preselected value. The session key in our protocol is determined jointly by both participants A 
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and B. Thus sk=H2(IDA||IDB||TA||TB||KAB) depends on TA = a·PA and TB = b·PB , and these are generated by A and B 
respectively. Therefore, any single user cannot control the outcome of the session keys or enforce others. 
6.7.   Reflection attack (RA) and unknown key-share attack (UKA) 
Following the proposed protocol, the session key is generated not only using KAB, also the identities of the 
participants and other session dependent tokens TA and TB. According to Wang et al. [8], our protocol can provide 
the resilience against unknown key-share attack and reflection attack.   
We sum up different security attributes and given in Table 1, which shows that our protocol is more secured than 
others. 
Table 1.  Security comparison. 
Protocol/Attribute KOA KSTIA MIMA PFS PKG-FS K-CI NKC RA UKA 
Wang [8]          
MB-I [9]          
Zhu [12]          
Cao [13]          
Cao [14]          
Proposed          
7.  Efficiency analysis 
In this section, we show the comparison of our protocol and other existing protocols in terms of communication 
round, bandwidth requirements and computation cost. Although the proposed protocol and the Cao’s protocol both 
possess same communication round, but the computation cost is reduced in the proposed protocol as it is shown in 
Table 2, which shows that the proposed protocol is more computation efficient than others. 
Table 2.  Efficiency comparison. 
Protocol/Cost Communication Cost                 Computation cost 
Communication time        Bandwidth required 
Wang [8] 2                   1P                   2BP+4EM 
MB-I [9] 2                   1P                   2BP+2EM+2PX 
Zhu [12] 3                   2P+2p                   12EM 
Cao [13] 3                   2P                   10EM+4EA 
Cao [14] 2                   2P                   10EM+4EA 
Proposed 2                   2P+h                   6EM+4EA 
BP: Bilinear pairing. PX: Pairing-based exponentiation; EM: Elliptic curve scalar multiplication; EA: Elliptic curve point addition; h: 
Length of MACk; p: Order of the group Ep(a,b). 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have identified two security flaws of Cao’s ID-2PAKA protocol and then proposed a 
modification to design a new paring-free ID-2PAKA protocol using ECC. The security of the proposed protocol is 
based on the difficulties of solving the ECDLP and CDHP problems. The proposed protocol eliminates the security 
flaws of Cao’s protocol and incorporates other security attributes. Table 1 and 2 show that proposed protocol is 
more secured and computationally efficient than other relevant protocols. 
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